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INTRODUCTION
Many analytical approaches to setting environmental standards
require some consideration of costs and benefits. Even technology-
based regulation, maligned by cost-benefit enthusiasts as the worst
form of regulatory excess, typically entails consideration of economic
costs. Cost-benefit analysis differs, however, from other analytical ap-
proaches in the following respect: it demands that the advantages and
disadvantages of a regulatory policy be reduced, as far as possible, to
numbers, and then further reduced to dollars and cents. In this fea-
ture of cost-benefit analysis lies its doom. Indeed, looking closely at
the products of this pricing scheme makes it seem not only a little
cold, but a little crazy as well.
Consider the following examples, which we are not making up.
They are not the work of a lunatic fringe, but, on the contrary, they
reflect the work products of some of the most influential and reputa-
ble of today's cost-benefit practitioners. We are not sure whether to
laugh or cry; we find it impossible to treat these studies as serious con-
tributions to a rational discussion.
Several years ago, states were in the middle of their litigation
against tobacco companies, seeking to recoup the medical expendi-
tures they had incurred as a result of smoking. At that time, W. Kip
Viscusi-a professor of law and economics at Harvard and the primary
source of the current $6.3 million estimate for the value of a statistical
life'-undertook research concluding that states, in fact, saved money
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as the result of smoking by their citizens. Why? Because they died
early!3 They thus saved their states the trouble and expense of provid-
ing nursing home care and other services associated with an aging
population.4
Viscusi didn't stop there. So great, under Viscusi's assumptions,
were the financial benefits to the states of their citizens' premature
deaths that, he suggested, "cigarette smoking should be subsidized rather
than taxed."'
Amazingly, this cynical conclusion has not been swept into the
dustbin where it belongs, but instead recently has been revived: the
tobacco company Philip Morris commissioned the well-known consult-
ing group Arthur D. Little to examine the financial benefits to the
Czech Republic of smoking among Czech citizens. Arthur D. Little
International, Inc., found that smoking was a financial boon for the
government-partly because, again, it caused citizens to die earlier
and thus reduced government expenditure on pensions, housing, and
health care.6 This conclusion relies, so far as we can determine, on
perfectly conventional cost-benefit analysis.
There is more. In recent years, much has been learned about the
special risks children face due to pesticides in their food, contami-
nants in their drinking water, ozone in the air, and so on. Because
cost-benefit analysis has become much more prominent at the same
time, there is now a budding industry in valuing children's health. Its
products are often bizarre.
Take the problem of lead poisoning in children. One of the most
serious and disturbing effects of lead contamination is the neurologi-
cal damage it can cause in young children, including permanently
diminished mental ability. Putting a dollar value on the (avoidable,
environmentally caused) retardation of children is a daunting task,
but economic analysts have not been deterred.
Randall Lutter, a frequent regulatory critic and a scholar at the
AEI-Brookings Joint Center for Regulatory Studies, argues that the
2 W. Kip ViscusI, CIGARETTE TAXATION AND THE SOCIAL CONSEQUENCES OF




5 Id. at 33 (emphasis added).
6ARTHUR D. LITTLE INT'L, INC., PUBLIC FINANCE BALANCE OF SMOKING IN THE
CZECH REPUBLIC 2 (2000), available at http://europe.cnn.com/2001/BUSINESS/07/
16/czech.morris/study.doc.
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way to value the damage lead causes in children is to look at the
amount parents of affected children spend on chelation therapy, a
chemical treatment that is supposed to cause excretion of lead from
the body.7 Parental spending on chelation supports an estimated
valuation of as low as $1100 per IQ point lost due to lead poisoning.8
Previous economic analyses by the EPA, based on the children's loss
of expected future earnings, have estimated the value to be much
higher-up to $9000 per IQ point.9 Based on his lower figure, Lutter
claims to have discovered that too much effort is going into controlling
lead: "Hazard standards that protect children far more than their
parents think is appropriate may make little sense"; thus, " [t]he agen-
cies should consider relaxing their lead standards."10
In fact, Lutter presents no evidence about what parents think,
only about what they spend on one rare variety of private medical
treatment (which, as it turns out, has not been proven medically effec-
tive for chronic, low-level lead poisoning)." Why should environ-
mental standards be based on what individuals are now spending on
desperate personal efforts to overcome social problems?
For sheer analytical audacity, Lutter's study faces some stiff com-
petition from another study concerning kids-this one concerning
the value, not of children's health, but of their lives. In this second
study, researchers examined mothers' car-seat fastening practices. 2
They calculated the difference between the time required to fasten
the seats correctly and the time mothers actually spent fastening their
children into their seats.13 Then they assigned a monetary value to
this difference of time based on the mothers' hourly wage rate (or, in
the case of nonworking moms, based on a guess at the wages they
might have earned).14 When mothers saved time-and, by hypothesis,
money-by fastening their children's car seats incorrectly, they were,
7RANDALL LUTIER, VALUING CHILDREN'S HEALTH: A REASSESSMENT OF THE
BENEFITS OF LOWER LEAD LEVELS 3 (AEI-Brookings Joint Ctr. for Regulatory Studies,
Working Paper No. 00-02, 2000), available at http://www.aei.brookings.org/
publications/working/working0002.pdf.
8 Id. at5.
9EPA, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF TOxIC SUBSTANCES CONTROL ACT SECTION 403:
HAZARD STANDARDS, at ch. 5 (1998).
10 LUTrER, supra note 7, at 3.
11 Id.
12 Paul S. Carlin & Robert Sandy, Estimating the Implicit Value of a Young Child's Life,
58 S. ECON.J. 186 (1991).
13 Id. at 192-96.
14 Id.
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according to the researchers, implicitly placing a finite monetary value
on the life-threatening risks to their children posed by car accidents.
Building on this calculation, the researchers were able to answer
the vexing question of how much a statistical child's life is worth to its
mother. (As the mother of a statistical child, she is naturally adept at
complex calculations comparing the value of saving a few seconds ver-
sus the slightly increased risk to her child!) The answer parallels Lut-
ter's finding that we are valuing our children too highly: in car-seat-
land, a child's life is worth only about $500,000.16
In this Article, we try to show that the absurdity of these particular
analyses, though striking, is not unique to them. Indeed, we will ar-
gue, cost-benefit analysis is so inherently flawed that if one scratches
the apparently benign surface of any of its products, one finds the
same kind of absurdity. But before launching into this critique, it will
be useful first to establish exactly what cost-benefit analysis is, and why
one might think it is a good idea.
I. DOLLARS AND DISCOUNTING
Cost-benefit analysis tries to mimic a basic function of markets by
setting an economic standard for measuring the success of the gov-
ernment's projects and programs. That is, cost-benefit analysis seeks
to perform, for public policy, a calculation that happens routinely in
the private sector. In evaluating a proposed new initiative, how do we
know if it is worth doing? The answer is much simpler in business
than in government.
Private businesses, striving to make money, only produce things
that they believe someone is willing to pay for. That is, firms only
produce things for which the benefits to consumers, measured by
consumers' willingness to pay for them, are expected to be greater
than the costs of production. It is technologically possible to produce
men's business suits in brightly colored polka dots. Nonetheless, suc-
cessful producers suspect that no one is willing to pay for such prod-
ucts, and usually stick to, at most, minor variations on suits in somber,
traditional hues. If some firm did happen to produce a polka-dotted
business suit, no one would be forced to buy it; the producer would
bear the entire loss resulting from the mistaken decision.
Government, in the view of many critics, is in constant danger of
It Id. at 197.
16 Id. at 196.
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drifting toward producing polka-dot suits-and making people pay for
them. Policies, regulations, and public spending do not face the test
of the marketplace; there are no consumers who can withhold their
dollars from the government until it produces the regulatory equiva-
lent of navy blue and charcoal gray. There is no single quantitative
objective for the public sector comparable to profit maximization for
businesses. Even with the best of intentions, critics suggest, govern-
ment programs can easily go astray for lack of an objective standard by
which to judge whether or not they are meeting citizens' needs.
Cost-benefit analysis sets out to do for government what the mar-
ket does for business: add up the benefits of a public policy and com-
pare them to the costs. The two sides of the ledger raise very different
issues.
A. Estimating Costs
The first step in a cost-benefit analysis is to calculate the costs of a
public policy. For example, the government may require a certain
kind of pollution control equipment, for which businesses must pay.
Even if a regulation is less detailed and only sets a ceiling on emis-
sions, it results in costs that can be at least roughly estimated through
research into available technologies and business strategies for com-
pliance.
The costs of protecting human health and the environment
through the use of pollution control devices and other approaches
are, by their very nature, measured in dollars. Thus, at least in theory,
the cost side of cost-benefit analysis is relatively straightforward. In
practice, as we shall see, it is not quite that simple.
The consideration of the costs of environmental protection is not
unique to cost-benefit analysis. Development of environmental regu-
lations has almost always involved consideration of economic costs,
with or without formal cost-benefit techniques. What is uni.que to
cost-benefit analysis, and far more problematic, is the other side of the
balance, the monetary valuation of the benefits of life, health, and na-
ture itself.
B. Monetizing Benefits
Since there are no natural prices for a healthy environment, cost-
benefit analysis requires the creation of artificial ones. This is the
hardest part of the process. Economists create artificial prices for
health and environmental benefits by studying what people would be
20021 1557
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willing to pay for them. One popular method, called "contingent
valuation," is essentially a form of opinion poll. Researchers ask a
cross section of the affected population how much they would be will-
ing to pay to preserve or protect something that can't be bought in a
store. 17
Many surveys of this sort have been done, producing prices for
things that appear to be priceless. For example, the average American
household is supposedly willing to pay $257 to prevent the extinction
of bald eagles, $208 to protect humpback whales, and $80 to protect
gray wolves.' These numbers are quite large: since there are about
100 million households in the country,19 the nation's total willingness
to pay for the preservation of bald eagles alone is ostensibly more than
$25 billion.
An alternative method of attaching prices to unpriced things in-
fers what people are willing to pay from observation of their behavior
in other markets. To assign a dollar value to risks to human life, for
example, economists usually calculate the extra wage-or "wage pre-
mium"-that is paid to workers who accept riskier jobs. Suppose that
two jobs are comparable, except that one is more dangerous and bet-
ter paid. If workers understand the risk and voluntarily accept the
more dangerous job, then they are implicitly setting a price on risk by
accepting the increased risk of death in exchange for increased wages.
What does this indirect inference about wages say about the value
of a life? A common estimate in recent cost-benefit analyses is that
avoiding a risk that would lead, on average, to one death is worth
roughly $6.3 million.20 This number, in particular, is of great impor-
17 For a recent review of the literature on nonmarket valuation (the title of which
coincidentally bears a strong resemblance to our own), see V. Kerry Smith, Pricing What
Is Priceless: A Status Report on Non-Market Valuation of Environmental Resources, in
INTERNATIONAL YEARBOOK OF ENVIRONMENTAL AND RESOURCE ECONOMICS,
1997/1998: A SURVEY OF CURRENT ISSUES 156 (Hank Folmer & Tim Tietenberg eds.,
1997).
18 John B. Loomis & Douglas S. White, Economic Benefits of Rare and Endangered Spe-
cies: Summary and Meta-analysis, 18 ECOLOGICAL ECON. 197, 199 tbl.1 (1996) (figures
converted to year 2000 dollars by the authors using the consumer price index).
19 POPULATION DIV., U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, ESTIMATES OF HOUSING UNITS,
HOUSEHOLDS, HOUSEHOLDS BY AGE OF HOUSEHOLDER, AND PERSONS PER HOUSEHOLD:
JULY 1, 1998 (1998), http://eire.census.gov/popest/archives/household/sthuhhl.txt.
20 The original calculation, based on research by W. Kip Viscusi, can be found in
EPA, THE BENEFITS AND COSTS OF THE CLEAN AIR ACT, 1970 TO 1990, at app. I (1997),
available at http://www.epa.gov/air/sect812/copy.html. For an example of a subse-
quent analysis citing the Clean Air Act analysis and adjusting only for inflation, see
EPA, ARSENIC IN DRINKING WATER RULE: ECONOMIC ANALYSIS 5-23 (2000) [hereinaf-
ter EPA, ARSENIC STUDY], available at http://www.epa.gov/safewater/ars/
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tance in cost-benefit analyses because avoided deaths are the most
thoroughly studied benefits of environmental regulations.
C. Discounting the Future
One final step in this quick sketch of cost-benefit analysis requires
explanation. Costs and benefits of a policy frequently occur at differ-
ent times. Often, costs are incurred today, or in the near future, to
prevent harm in the more remote future. When the analysis spans a
number of years, future costs and benefits are discounted, or treated as
equivalent to smaller amounts of money in today's dollars.
Discounting is a procedure developed by economists in order to
evaluate investments that produce future income. The case for dis-
counting begins with the observation that $100 received today is worth
more than $100 received next year, even in the absence of inflation.
For one thing, you could put your money in the bank today and earn
interest by next year. Suppose that your bank account earns 3% in-
terest per year. In that case, if you received the $100 today rather
than next year, you would earn $3 in interest, giving you a total of
$103 next year. Likewise, in order to get $100 next year you only need
to deposit $97 today.2' So, at a 3% discount rate, economists would say
that $100 next year has a present value of $97 in today's dollars.
For longer periods of time, the effect is magnified: at a 3% dis-
count rate, $100 twenty years from now has a present value of only
$55. The larger the discount rate, and/or the longer the time inter-
vals involved, the smaller the present value: at a 5% discount rate, for
example, $100 twenty years from now has a present value of only $38.
Cost-benefit analysis routinely uses the present value of future
benefits; that is, it compares current costs, not to the actual dollar
value of future benefits, but to the smaller amount you would have to
put into a hypothetical savings account today to obtain those benefits
in the future. This application of discounting is essential, and indeed
commonplace, for many practical financial decisions. If offered a
choice of investment opportunities with payoffs at different times in
the future, you can (and should) discount the future payoffs to the
present in order to compare them to each other. The important issue
for environmental policy, as we shall see, is whether this logic also ap-
econanalysis.pdf. The arsenic study used $6.1 million in 1999 dollars, id., which is
equivalent to $6.3 million in 2000 dollars.
21 The examples in the text are rounded off to the nearest dollar. The actual pre-
sent value, rounded to the nearest cent, would be $97.09.
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plies to outcomes far in the future, and to opportunities-like long
life and good health-that are not naturally stated in dollar terms.
II. THE CASE FOR COST-BENEFIT
Before describing the problems with cost-benefit analysis, it will be
useful to set forth the arguments in favor of this type of analysis. Many
different arguments for cost-benefit analysis have been offered over
the years. Most of the arguments fall into one of two broad categories.
First, there are economic assertions that better results can be achieved
with cost-benefit analysis. Second, there are legal and political claims
that a more objective and open government process can emerge
through this kind of analysis.
A. Better Results
Economics frequently focuses on increasing efficiency-on getting
the most desirable results from the least resources. How do we know
that greater regulatory efficiency is needed? For many economists,
this is an article of faith: greater efficiency is always a top priority, in
regulation or elsewhere. Cost-benefit analysis supposedly furthers ef-
ficiency by ensuring that regulations are only adopted when benefits
exceed costs and by helping direct regulators' attention to those prob-
lems for which regulatory intervention will yield the greatest net bene-
fits.
But many advocates also raise a more specific argument, imbued
with a greater sense of urgency. The government, it is said, often is-
sues rules that are insanely expensive, out of all proportion to their
benefits-a problem that could be solved if proposed regulations were
screened through cost-benefit analysis. Thus much of the case for cost-
benefit analysis depends on the case against current regulation.
Scarcely a congressional hearing on environmental policy occurs
in which fantastic estimates of the costs of federal regulations do not
figure prominently. Economists routinely cite such estimates as proof
of the need for more economic analysis. Browse the websites of any of
a variety of think tanks, and you will find numerous references to the
extravagant costs of regulation.
The estimates typically bandied about are astonishingly high: ac-
cording to several widely circulated studies, we often spend hundreds
of millions, and sometimes billions, of dollars for every single human
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life, or even year of life, we save through regulation. 2  One widely
cited study claims that the cost of life-saving interventions can reach as
high as $99 billion for every life-year saved. ' Numbers like these have
been used to argue that current regulatory costs are not only chaoti-
cally variable but also unacceptably high. They even have been relied
upon to claim that the existing regulatory system actually kills people by
imposing some very costly life-saving requirements while other, less
expensive and more effective life-saving possibilities remain un-
touched. Indeed, one study concluded that we could save as many as
sixty thousand more lives every year, with no increase in costs, if we
simply spent our money on the least rather than most expensive op-
portunities for saving lives. 4 Relying on this research (of which he was
a coauthor), John Graham, the current head of the Office of Informa-
tion and Regulatory Affairs in the Office of Management and Budget,
and a prominent proponent of cost-benefit analysis, has called the ex-
isting state of affairs "statistical murder."
25
From this perspective, cost-benefit analysis emerges as both a
money-saver and a life-saver. By subjecting regulations to a cost-
benefit test, we would not only stop spending hundreds of millions or
billions of dollars to save a single life, we could also take that money
and spend it on saving even more lives through different life-saving
measures.
That, at least, is the theory. We will argue in the following Sec-
tions that there are good reasons to question both the theory and the
facts it rests on. Nevertheless, the notion that the current system pro-
duces crazy, even deadly, rules, and that better economic analysis
22 See John F. Morrall III, A Review of the Record, REGULATION, Nov.-Dec. 1986, at
25, 30 tbl.4, relied upon in, among others, STEPHEN BREYER, BREAKING THE VICIOUS
CIRCLE: TOWARD EFFECTIVE RISK REGULATION (1993); W. Kip VIScUsI, FATAL
TRADEOFFS: PUBLIC AND PRIVATE RESPONSIBILITIES FOR RISK 264 tbl.14-5 (1992);
OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, REGULATORY PROGRAM OF THE UNITED STATES
GOVERNMENT, APRIL 1, 1991-MARCH 31, 1992 (1991); and Kenneth J. Arrow et al., Is
There a Role for Benefit-Cost Analysis in Environmental, Health, and Safety Regulation?, 272
SCIENCE 221 (1996).
23 Tammy 0. Tengs et al., Five-Hundred Life-Saving Interventions and Their Cost-
Effectiveness, 15 RISK ANALYSIS 369, 377 app. A (1995). For a critique of this study, see
Lisa Heinzerling & Frank Ackerman, The Humbugs of the Anti-Regulatory Movement, 87
CORNELL L. REV. 648, 650-61 (2002).
24 Tammy 0. Tengs & John D. Graham, The Opportunity Costs of Haphazard Social
Investments in Life-Saving, in RISKS, COSTS, AND LIVES SAVED: GETTING BETTER RESULTS
FROM REGULATION 167,'172 (Robert W. Hahn ed., 1996).
25 Risk Assessment and Cost-Benefit Analysis: Hearing Before the House Comm. on Sci.,
104th Cong. 71 (1995) (statement ofJohn D. Graham, Head of the Office of Informa-
tion and Regulatory Affairs).
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would avert this terrible result, remains one of the most persistent ar-
guments offered on behalf of cost-benefit analysis.
B. Objectivity and Transparency
A second important set of arguments holds that cost-benefit analy-
sis would produce a better regulatory process--one that is more objec-
tive and more transparent, and thus more accountable to the public.
The holy grail of administrative law is agency decision making
based on objective standards. The idea is to prevent an agency either
from making arbitrary decisions or, more invidiously, from benefiting
politically-favored groups through its decisions. Cost-benefit analysis
has been offered as a means of constraining agency discretion in this
way.
Another important goal, said to be promoted by cost-benefit
analysis, is the transparency of administrative procedures. Decisions
about environmental protection are notoriously complex. They re-
flect the input of biologists, toxicologists, epidemiologists, economists,
engineers, lawyers, and other experts whose work is complicated and
arcane. The technical details of these decisions often conceal crucial
judgments about how much scientific uncertainty is too much, which
human populations should be protected from illness and even death,
and how important the future is relative to the present.
In order for the public to be part of the process of decision mak-
ing about the environment, these judgments must be offered and de-
bated in language accessible to people who are not biologists, toxi-
cologists, or other kinds of experts. Many advocates of cost-benefit
analysis believe that their methodology provides such a language. Re-
latedly, they assert that cost-benefit analysis renders decision making
transparent insofar as it requires decision makers to reveal all of the
assumptions and uncertainties reflected in their decisions.
III. FUNDAMENTAL FLAws
As we have seen, cost-benefit analysis involves the creation of arti-
ficial markets for things-like good health, long life, and clean air-
that are not bought and sold. It also involves the devaluation of future
events through discounting.
So described, the mindset of the cost-benefit analyst is likely to
seem quite foreign. The translation of all good things into dollars and
the devaluation of the future are inconsistent with the way many peo-
ple view the world. Most of us believe that money doesn't buy happi-
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ness. Most religions tell us that every human life is sacred; it is obvi-
ously illegal, as well as immoral, to buy and sell human lives. Most
parents tell their children to eat their vegetables and do their home-
work, even though the rewards of these onerous activities lie far in the
future. Monetizing human lives and discounting future benefits seem
at odds with these common perspectives.
The cost-benefit approach also is inconsistent with the way many
of us make daily decisions. Imagine performing a new cost-benefit
analysis to decide whether to get up and go to work every morning,
whether to exercise or eat right on any given day, whether to wash the
dishes or leave them in the sink, and so on. Inaction would win far
too often-and an absurd amount of effort would be spent on analy-
sis. Most people have long-run goals, commitments, and habits that
make such daily balancing exercises either redundant or counterpro-
ductive. The same might be true of society as a whole undertaking
individual steps in the pursuit of any goal, set for the long haul, that
cannot be reached overnight-including, for example, the achieve-
ment of a clean environment.
Moving beyond these intuitive responses, we offer in this Section a
detailed explanation of why cost-benefit analysis of environmental
protection fails to live up to the hopes and claims of its advocates.
There is no quick fix, because these failures are intrinsic to the meth-
odology, appearing whenever it is applied to any complex environ-
mental problem. In our view, cost-benefit analysis suffers from four
fundamental flaws, addressed in the next four Sections:
* the standard economic approaches to valuation are inaccurate
and implausible;
* the use of discounting improperly trivializes future harms and
the irreversibility of some environmental problems;
" the reliance on aggregate, monetized benefits excludes ques-
tions of fairness and morality; and
* the value-laden and complex cost-benefit process is neither
objective nor transparent.
A. Dollars Without Sense
Recall that cost-benefit analysis requires the creation of artificial
prices for all relevant health and environmental impacts. To weigh
the benefits of regulation against the costs, we need to know the
monetary value of preventing the extinction of species, preserving
many different ecosystems, avoiding all manner of serious health im-
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pacts, and even saving human lives. Without such numbers, cost-
benefit analysis cannot be conducted.
Artificial prices have been estimated for many, though by no
means all, benefits of regulation. As discussed, preventing the extinc-
tion of bald eagles reportedly goes for somewhat more than $250 per
household. Preventing retardation due to childhood lead poisoning
comes in at about $9000 per lost IQ point in the standard view, or as
low as $1100 per point in Lutter's alternative. Saving a life is ostensi-
bly worth $6.3 million.
This quantitative precision, achieved through a variety of indirect
techniques for valuation, comes at the expense of accuracy and some-
times, common sense. Though problems arise in many areas of valua-
tion, we will focus primarily on the efforts to attach a monetary value
to human life, both because of its importance in cost-benefit analysis
and because of its glaring contradictions.
We note, however, that the same kind of problems we are about to
discuss affect other valuation issues raised by cost-benefit analysis, such
as estimating the value of clean water, biodiversity, or entire ecosys-
tems. The upshot is that cost-benefit analysis is fundamentally inca-
pable of delivering on its promise of more economically efficient deci-
sions about protecting human life, health, and the environment.
Absent a credible monetary metric for calculating the benefits of regu-
lation, cost-benefit analysis is inherently unreliable.
1. There Are No "Statistical" People
What can it mean to say that saving one life is worth $6.3 million?
Human life is the ultimate example of a value that is not a commodity
and does not have a price. You cannot buy the right to kill someone
for $6.3 million, nor for any other price. Most systems of ethical and
religious belief maintain that every life is sacred. If analysts calculated
the value of life itself by asking people what it is worth to them (the
most common method of valuation of other environmental benefits),
the answer would be infinite, as "no finite amount of money could
compensate a person for the loss of his life, simply because money is
no good to him when he is dead."
2 6
The standard response is that a value like $6.3 million is not actu-
ally a price on an individual's life or death. Rather, it is a way of ex-
pressing the value of small risks of death; for example, it is one million
26 John Broome, Trying to Value a Life, 9J. PUB. ECON. 91, 92 (1978).
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times the value of a one in a million risk. If people are willing to pay
$6.30 to avoid a one in a million increase in the risk of death, then the
"value of a statistical life" is $6.3 million. 7
Unfortunately, this explanation fails to resolve the dilemma. It is
true that risk (or "statistical life") and life itself are distinct concepts.
In practice, however, analysts often ignore the distinction between
281
valuing risk and valuing life. Many regulations reduce risk for a large
number of people and avoid actual death for a much smaller number.
A complete cost-benefit analysis should, therefore, include valuation
of both of these benefits. However, the standard practice is to calcu-
late a value only for "statistical" life and to ignore life itself.
The confusion between the valuation of risk and the valuation of
life itself is embedded in current regulatory practice in another way as
well. The Office of Management and Budget, which reviews cost-
benefit analyses prepared by federal agencies pursuant to executive
order, instructs agencies to discount the benefits of life-saving regula-
tions from the moment of avoided death, rather than from the time
when the risk of death is reduced.2 9 This approach to discounting is
plainly inconsistent with the claim that cost-benefit analysis seeks to
evaluate risk. When a life-threatening disease, such as cancer, has a
long latency period, many years may pass between the time when a
risk is imposed and the time of death. If monetary valuations of statis-
tical life represented risk, instead of life, then the value of statistical
life would be discounted from the date of a change in risk (typically,
when a new regulation is enforced) rather than from the much later
date of avoided actual death.
In acknowledging the monetary value of reducing risk, economic
analysts have contributed to our growing awareness that life-
threatening risk itself-and not just the end result of such risk,
death-is an injury. But they have blurred the line between risks and
actual deaths, by calculating the value of reduced risk while pretend-
ing that they have produced a valuation of life itself. The paradox of
27 E.g., VIscusI, supra note 1, at 46.
28 For further elaboration, see Lisa Heinzerling, The Rights of Statistical People, 24
HARv. ENVTL. L. REV. 189, 203-06 (2000), arguing that many analysts treat the valua-
tion of risk as equivalent to a valuation of life without calculating the value of life.
29 ADM'R OF THE OFFICE OF INFO. & REGULATORY AFFAIRS, OFFICE OF MGMT. &
BUDGET, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF FEDERAL REGULATIONS UNDER EXECUTIVE ORDER
12,866, at pt. III.B.5(a) (Jan. 11, 1996), http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/inforeg/
riaguide.html.
30 Lisa Heinzerling, Discounting Life, 108 YALE L.J. 1911, 1913 (1999); Lisa Heinzer-
ling, Discounting OurFuture, 34 LAND & WATER L. REV. 39, 71 (1999).
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monetizing the infinite or immeasurable value of human life has not
been resolved; it only has been glossed over.
2. People Care About Other People
Another large problem with the standard approach to valuation of
life is that it asks individuals (either directly through surveys or indi-
rectly through observing wage and job choices) only about their atti-
tudes toward risks to themselves.
A recurring theme in literature suggests that our deepest and no-
blest sentiments involve valuing someone else's life more highly than
our own: think of parents' devotion to their children, soldiers' com-
mitment to those whom they are protecting, lovers' concern for each
other. Most spiritual beliefs call on us to value the lives of others-not
only those closest to us, but also those whom we have never met.
This point echoes a procedure that has become familiar in other
areas of environmental valuation. Economists often ask about exis-
tence values: how much is the existence of a wilderness area or an
endangered species worth to you, even if you never will experience it
personally? If this question makes sense for bald eagles and national
parks, it must be at least as important when applied to safe drinking
water and working conditions for people we don't know.
What is the existence value of a person you will never meet? How
much is it worth to you to prevent a death far away? The answer can-
not be deduced solely from your attitudes toward risks to yourself. We
are not aware of any attempts to quantify the existence value of the
life of a stranger, let alone a relative or a friend, but we are sure that
most belief systems affirm that this value is substantial (assuming, of
course, that the value of life is a number in the first place).
3. Voting Is Different from Buying
Cost-benefit analysis, which relies on estimates of individuals'
preferences as consumers, also fails to address the collective choice
presented to society by most public health and environmental prob-
lems.
Valuation of environmental benefits is based on individuals' pri-
vate decisions as consumers or workers, not on their public values as
citizens. However, policies that protect the environment are often
public goods and are not available for purchase in individual portions.
In a classic example of this distinction, the philosopher Mark Sagoff
found that his students, in their role as citizens, opposed commercial
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ski development in a nearby wilderness area, but, in their role as con-
sumers, would plan to go skiing there if the development were built.
3'
There is no contradiction between these two views: as individual con-
sumers, the students would have no way to express their collective
preference for wilderness preservation. Their individual willingness to
pay for skiing would send a misleading signal about their views as citi-
zens.
It is often impossible to arrive at a meaningful social valuation by
adding up the willingness to pay expressed by individuals. What could
it mean to ask how much you are personally willing to pay to clean up
a major oil spill? If no one else contributes, the clean-up will not hap-
pen regardless of your decision. As the Nobel Prize-winning econo-
mist Amartya Sen has pointed out, if your willingness to pay for a
large-scale public initiative is independent of what others are paying,
then you probably have not understood the nature of the problem.32
Instead, a collective decision about collective resources is required.
In a similar vein, the philosopher Henry Richardson argues that
reliance on the cost-benefit standard forecloses the process of demo-
cratic deliberation that is necessary for intelligent decision making. In
his view, attempts to make decisions based on monetary valuation of
benefits freeze preferences in advance, leaving no room for the
changes in response to new information, rethinking of the issues, and
negotiated compromises that lie at the heart of the deliberative proc-
33
ess.
Cost-benefit analysis turns public citizens into selfish consumers
and interconnected communities into atomized individuals. In this
way, it distorts the question it sets out to answer-how much do we, as
a society, value health and the environment?
4. Numbers Don't Tell Us Everything
A few simple examples illustrate that numerically equal risks are
not always equally deserving of regulatory response. The death rate is
31 MARK SAGOFF, THE ECONOMY OF THE EARTH: PHILOSOPHY, LAW, AND THE
ENVIRONMENT 50-53 (1988).
32 See Amartya Sen, The Discipline of Cost-Benefit Analysis, 29 J. LEGAL STUD. 931, 949
(2000) ("The 'lone ranger' model of environmental evaluation ... confounds the na-
ture of the problem at hand.").
33 Henry S. Richardson, The Stupidity of the Cost-Benefit Standard, 29 J. LEGAL STUD.
971, 986-89 (2000). On the importance of allowing preference change in response to
deliberation, see also Cass R. Sunstein, Preferences and Politics, 20 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 3
(1991).
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roughly the same (somewhat less than one in a million) from a day of
downhill skiing, from a day of working in the construction industry, or
from drinking about twenty liters of water containing fifty parts per
billion of arsenic-the old regulatory limit that was recently revised by
the EPA.3 4 This does not mean that society's responsibility to reduce
risks is the same in each case.
Most people view risks imposed by others, without an individual's
consent, as more worthy of government intervention than risks that an
individual knowingly accepts. On that basis, the highest priority
among our three examples is to reduce drinking water contamina-
tion-a hazard to which no one has consented. The acceptance of a
risky occupation such as construction is at best quasi-voluntary; it in-
volves somewhat more individual discretion than the "choice" of pub-
lic drinking water supplies even though many people go to work un-
der great economic pressure and with little information about
occupational hazards. In contrast, the choice of risky recreational
pursuits such as skiing is entirely discretionary; obviously, no one is
forced to ski. Safety regulation in construction work is thus more ur-
gent than regulation of skiing, despite the equality of numerical risk.
In short, even for ultimate values such as life and death, the social
context is decisive in our evaluation of risks. Cost-benefit analysis as-
sumes the existence of generic, acontextual risk and thereby ignores
the contextual information that determines the manner in which
many people, in practice, think about real risks to real people.
34 Skiing: in 1999 there were 30 fatalities and 52.2 million skier/snowboarder visits
to ski slopes, for a death rate of 0.57 per million skier-days. National Ski Areas Associa-
tion, Facts About Skiing/Snowboarding, at http://www.nsaa.org/safety/facts-about.asp.
Construction: in 1997 there were 14.1 fatal injuries per 100,000 full-time construc-
tion workers. NAT'L INST. FOR OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY & HEALTH, WORKER HEALTH
CHARTBOOK, 2000, at 36 (2000), available at http://www.cdc.gov/niosh/
00-127pd.html. Assuming 250 days per full-time year, the death rate was 0.56 per mil-
lion days of work.
Arsenic male lifetime cancer rates per ppb of arsenic are 2.53 x 10-  for bladder
cancer and 2.75 x 10- for lung cancer. EPA, ARSENIC STUDY, supra note 20, at B-8
exh.2. (Female cancer rates are higher.) Death rates are 26% for bladder cancer and
88% for lung cancer, for a combined male mortality rate of 3.08 x 10-5 per lifetime ppb
of arsenic. Id.
The EPA analysis is based on a person who drinks 2 liters of water per day. Id. at
B-5. So lifetime consumption over 70 years is 2 x 70 x 365, which equals 5.11 x 10' li-
ters. If risk is proportional to arsenic consumption, the risk per ppb per liter is (3.08 x
10"-)/(5.11 x 10'), which equals 6.03 x 10' per ppb per liter, or 3.01 x 10" per liter of
50 ppb water. At that rate, the risk of death from drinking 19 liters of 50 ppb water
equals 19 X (3.01 x 108), which is 0.57 in a million.
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5. Artificial Prices Are Expensive
Finally, the economic valuation called for by cost-benefit analysis is
fundamentally flawed because it demands an enormous volume of
consistently updated information, which is beyond the practical capac-
ity of our society to generate.
All attempts at valuation of the environment begin with a prob-
lem: the goal is to assign monetary prices to things that have no prices
because they are not for sale. One of the great strengths of the mar-
ket is that it provides so much information about real prices. For any
commodity that actually is bought and sold, prices are communicated
automatically, almost costlessly, and with constant updates as needed.
To create artificial prices for environmental values, economists have
to find some way to mimic the operation of the market. Unfortu-
nately, the process is far from automatic, certainly not costless, and
has to be repeated every time an updated price is needed.
As a result, there is constant pressure to use outdated or inappro-
priate valuations. Indeed, there are sound economic reasons for do-
ing so: no one can afford constant updates, and significant savings
can be achieved by using valuations created for other cases. In the
EPA's original cost-benefit analysis of a revised standard for arsenic in
drinking water, a valuation estimated for a case of chronic bronchitis,
taken from a study performed ten years earlier, was used to represent
35the value of a case of nonfatal bladder cancer.
This is not, we hope and believe, because anyone thinks that
bronchitis and bladder cancer are the same disease. The reason is
more mundane: no one has performed an analysis of the cost of
bladder cancer, and even the extensive analysis of arsenic regulations
did not include enough time and money to do so. Therefore, the in-
vestigators used an estimated value for a very different disease. The
only explanation offered for this procedure was that it had been done
before, and the investigators thought nothing better was available.36
Use of the bronchitis valuation to represent bladder cancer can
charitably be described as "grasping at straws." Lacking the time and
money to fill in the blank carefully, the economists simply picked a
number. This is not remotely close to the level of rigor that is seen
throughout the natural science, engineering, and public health por-
tions of the arsenic analysis, yet it will happen again for exactly the
35 EPA, ARSENIC STUDY, supra note 20, at 5-24 (citation omitted).
36 Id.
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same reason. It is not a failure of will or intellect, but rather the ines-
capable limitations of time and budget that lead to reliance on dated,
inappropriate, and incomplete information to fill in the gaps on the
benefit side of a cost-benefit analysis.
B. Trivializing the Future
One of the great triumphs of environmental law is its focus on the
future: it seeks to avert harms to people and to natural resources in
the future, not only within this generation, but within future genera-
tions as well. Indeed, one of the primary objectives of the National
Environmental Policy Act, which has been called our basic charter of
environmental protection, is to nudge the nation into "fulfill [ing] the
responsibilities of each generation as trustee of the environment for
succeeding generations.
Protection of endangered species and ecosystems, reduction of
pollution from persistent chemicals such as dioxin and DDT, preven-
tion of long-latency diseases such as cancer, protection of the unborn
against the health hazards from exposure to toxins in the womb-all
of these protections are afforded by environmental law, and all of
them look to the future as well as to the present. Environmental law
seeks, moreover, to avoid the unpleasant surprises that come with dis-
continuities and irreversibility-the kinds of events that outstrip our
powers of quantitative prediction. Here too, environmental law tries
to protect the future in addition to the present.
Cost-benefit analysis systematically downgrades the importance of
the future in two ways: through the technique of discounting and
through predictive methodologies that take inadequate account of the
possibility of catastrophic and irreversible events.
The most common, and commonsense, argument in favor of dis-
counting future human lives saved, illnesses averted, and ecological
disasters prevented, is that it is better to suffer a harm later rather
than sooner. What's wrong with this argument? A lot, as it turns out.
1. Do Future Generations Count?
The first problem with the later-is-better argument for discounting
is that it assumes that one person is deciding between dying or falling
ill now, or dying or falling ill later. In that case, virtually everyone
would prefer later. But many environmental programs protect the far
37 42 U.S.C. § 4331(b) (1) (1994).
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future, beyond the lifetime of today's decision makers. Thus, the
choice implicit in discounting is between preventing harms to the cur-
rent generation and preventing similar harms to future generations.
Seen in this way, discounting looks like a fancyjustification for foisting
our problems off onto the people who come after us.
The time periods involved in protecting the environment are of-
ten enormous-many decades for a wide range of problems, and even
many centuries, in the case of climate change, radioactive waste, and
other persistent toxins. With time spans this long, discounting at any
positive rate will make even global catastrophes seem trivial. At a dis-
count rate of five percent, for' example, the death of a billion people
500 years from now becomes less serious than the death of one person
today.
2. Does Haste Prevent Waste?
The justification for discounting often assumes that environ-
mental problems will not get any worse if we wait to address them. In
the market paradigm, buying environmental protection is just like
buying any other commodity. You can buy a new computer now or
later, and if you don't need it this year, you should probably wait. The
technology will undoubtedly keep improving, so next year's models
will do more yet cost less. An exactly parallel argument has been
made about climate change (and other environmental problems) by
some economists: if we wait for further technological progress, we will
get more for our climate change mitigation dollars in the future.
If environmental protection were mass produced by the computer
industry, and if environmental problems would agree to stand still in-
definitely and wait for us to respond, this might be a reasonable ap-
proach. In the real world, however, it is a ludicrous and dangerous
strategy.
Too many years of delay might mean that the polar ice cap
melts, the spent uranium leaks out of the containment ponds, the
hazardous waste seeps into groundwater and basements and back-
yards-at which point we cannot put the genie back in the bottle at
any reasonable cost (or perhaps not at all).
Environmentalists often talk of potential "crises"-threats that
38 The general formula for calculating the present value of a benefit of X to be re-
ceived Nyears from now when the discount rate is ris: X/(1 + r)
N. WILLIAMJ. BAUMOL
& ALAN S. BLINDER, ECONOMICS: PRINCIPLES AND POLICY 386-87 (6th ed. 1994). The
example in the text comes from DEREK PARFIT, REASONS AND PERSONS 357 (1984).
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problems will become suddenly and irreversibly worse. In response to
such threats, environmentalists and some governments advocate the
so-called "precautionary principle," which calls upon regulators to err
on the side of caution and protection when risks are uncertain. Cost-
benefit analysts, for the most part, do not assume the possibility of cri-
sis. Their world view assumes stable problems, with control costs that
are stable or declining over time, and thus finds precautionary in-
vestment in environmental protection to be a needless expense. Dis-
counting is part of this noncrisis perspective. By implying that the
present cost of future environmental harms declines, lockstep, with
every year that we look ahead, discounting ignores the possibility of
catastrophic and irreversible harms.
For this very reason, some prominent economists have rejected
the discounting of intangibles. As William Baumol wrote in an impor-
tant early article on discounting the benefits of public projects:
There are important externalities and investments of the public goods
variety which cry for special attention. Irreversibilities constitute a prime
example. If we poison our soil so that never again will it be the same, if
we destroy the Grand Canyon and turn it into a hydroelectric plant, we
give up assets which like Goldsmith's bold peasantry, " . . . their country's
pride, when once destroy'd can never be supplied." All the wealth and
resources of future generations will not suffice to restore them .'
Most cost-benefit analysts do not exhibit this kind of humility about
what the future might hold in store for us.
3. Begging the Question
Extensive discounting of future environmental problems lies at
the heart of many recent reviews of regulatory costs and benefits that
charge "statistical murder." When the costs and benefits of environ-
mental protection are compared to those of safety rules (like requir-
ing fire extinguishers for airplanes) or medical procedures (like vac-
cinating children against disease), environmental protection almost
always comes out the loser. Why is this so?
4
0
These studies all discount future environmental benefits by at
least five percent per year. This has little effect on the evaluation of
3q William J. BatImol, On the Social Rate of Discount, 58 AM. ECON. REV. 788, 801
(1968).
40 This discussion draws from Lisa Heinzerling, Regulatory Costs of Mythic Propor-
tions, 107 YALE L.J. 1981 (1998); Lisa Heinzerling, Five-Hundred Life-Saving Interventions
and Their Misuse in the Debate Over Regulatory Reform, RISK (forthcoming 2002); and
Heinzerling & Ackerman, supra note 23.
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programs-like auto safety rules requiring seat belts and fire safety
rules requiring smoke alarms-that could start saving lives right away.
However, for environmental programs like hazardous waste cleanups
and control of persistent toxins that save lives in the future, discount-
ing matters a great deal. Especially since, as explained above, the
benefits are assumed to occur in the future when deaths are avoided,
rather than in the near term when risks are reduced.
By using discounting, analysts assume the answer to the question
they purport to address. That is, which programs are most worth-
while? The researchers begin with premises that guarantee that pro-
grams designed for the long haul (like environmental protection) are
not as important as programs that look to the shorter term. When re-
peated without discounting (or with benefits assumed to occur when
risks are reduced), these studies support many more environmental
programs, and the cry of "statistical murder" rings hollow.
4. Citizens and Consumers-Reprise
The issue of discounting illustrates once again the failure of cost-
benefit analysis to take into account the difference between citizens
and consumers. Many people advocate discounting on the ground
that it reflects people's preferences, as expressed in market decisions
concerning risk. But again, this omits the possibility that people will
have different preferences when they take on a different role. The fu-
ture seems to matter much more to American citizens than to Ameri-
can consumers, even though they are of course the same people.
For example, Americans are notoriously bad at saving money on
their own, apparently expressing a disinterest in the future. Still, So-
cial Security is arguably the most popular entitlement program in the
United States. The tension between Americans' personal saving hab-
its and their enthusiasm for Social Security implies a sharp divergence
between the temporal preferences of people as consumers and as citi-
zens. Thus, private preferences for current over future consumption
should not be used to subvert public judgments that future harms are
as important as immediate ones.
C. Exacerbating Inequality
The third fundamental defect of cost-benefit analysis is that it
tends to ignore, and therefore has the effect of reinforcing, patterns
of economic and social inequality. Cost-benefit analysis consists of
adding up all the costs of a policy, adding up all the benefits, and
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comparing the totals. Implicit -in this innocuous-sounding procedure
is the controversial assumption that it does not matter who gets the
benefits and who pays the costs. Both benefits and costs are measured
simply as dollar totals; those totals are silent on questions of equity
and distribution of resources.
In our society, concerns about equity frequently do, and should,
enter into debates over public policy. There is an important differ-
ence between spending state tax revenues to improve the parks in rich
communities and spending the same revenues to clean up pollution
in poor communities. The value of these two initiatives, measured us-
ing cost-benefit analysis, might be the same in both cases, but this
does not mean that the two policies are equally urgent or desirable. '
The problem of equity runs even deeper. Benefits are typically
measured by willingness to pay for environmental improvement, and
the rich are able and willing to pay for more than the poor. Imagine a
cost-benefit analysis of siting an undesirable facility, such as a landfill
or incinerator. Wealthy communities are willing to pay more for the
benefit of not having the facility in their backyards; thus, the net bene-
fits to society as a whole will be maximized by putting the facility in a
low-income area. (Note that wealthy communities do not actually
have to pay for the benefit of avoiding the facility; the analysis de-
pends only on the fact that they are willing to pay.)
This kind of logic was made (in)famous in a 1991 memo circu-
lated by Lawrence Summers (former Secretary of the Treasury and
current President of Harvard University) when he was the chief
economist at the World Bank. Discussing the migration of "dirty in-
dustries" to developing countries, Summers' memo explained:
The measurements of the costs of health impairing pollution depend[]
on the foregone earnings from increased morbidity and mortality. From
this point of view a given amount of health impairing pollution should
be done in the country with the lowest cost, which will be the country
with the lowest wages. I think the economic logic behind dumping a
load of toxic waste in the lowest wage country is impeccable and we
should face up to that.
4 1
After this memo became public, Brazil's then-Secretary of the En-
vironmentJose Lutzenburger wrote to Summers:
Your reasoning is perfectly logical but totally insane ... Your thoughts
41 Memorandum from Lawrence H. Summers, Chief Economist, World Bank to
Distribution (Dec. 12, 1991), http://www.whirledbank.org/ourwords/summers.html
[hereinafter Summers Memo].
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[provide] a concrete example of the unbelievable alienation, reduction-
ist thinking, social ruthlessness and the arrogant ignorance of many con-
42
ventional "economists" concerning the nature of the world we live in.
If decisions are based strictly on cost-benefit analysis and willing-
ness to pay, most environmental burdens will end up being imposed
on the countries, communities, and individuals with the least re-
sources. This theoretical pattern bears an uncomfortably close re-
semblance to reality. Cost-benefit methods should not be blamed for
existing patterns of environmental injustice; we suspect that pollution
is typically dumped on the poor without waiting for formal analysis.
Still, cost-benefit analysis rationalizes and reinforces the problem, al-
lowing environmental burdens to flow downhill along the income
gradients of an unequal world. It is hard to see this as part of an eco-
nomically optimal or politically objective method of decision making.
In short, equity is an important criterion for evaluation of public
policy, but it does not fit into the cost-benefit framework. The same is
true of questions of rights and morality principles that are not reduci-
ble to monetary terms. Calculations that are acceptable, even com-
monsense, for financial matters can prove absurd or objectionable
when applied to moral issues, as shown by the following example.
A financial investment with benefits worth five times its costs
would seem like an obviously attractive bargain. Compare this to the
estimates that front airbags on the passenger side of automobiles may
cause one death, usually of a child, for every five lives saved. If we
really believed that lives-even statistical lives-were worth $6 million,
or any other finite dollar amount, then endorsing the airbags should
be no more complicated than accepting the financial investment.
However, many people do find the airbag tradeoff troubling or unac-
ceptable, implying that there is a different, nonquantitative value of a
life that is at stake here. If a public policy brought some people five
dollars of benefits for every one dollar it cost to others, the winners
could in theory compensate the losers. No such compensation is pos-
sible if winning and losing are measured in deaths rather than dol-
lars.43
In comparing the deaths of adults prevented by airbags with the
deaths of children caused by airbags, or in exploring countless other
42 Postscript to Summers Memo, supra note 41 (ellipsis in original).
43 See FRED KUCHLER & ELISE GOLAN, U.S. DEP'T OF AGRIc., ASSIGNING VALUES TO
LIFE: COMPARING METHODS FOR VALUING HEALTH RISKS 52 (Agric. Econ. Report No.
784, 1999) ("[I]t is difficult to argue that a life lost in one group can be offset one-for-
one by a life saved in another group.").
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harms that might be mitigated through regulation, the real debate is
not between rival cost-benefit analyses. Rather, it is between environ-
mental advocates who frame the issue as a matter of rights and ethics,
and others who see it as an acceptable area for economic calculation.
That debate is inescapable, and it logically comes before the details of
evaluating costs and benefits.
D. Less Objectivity and Transparency
A fourth fundamental flaw of cost-benefit analysis is that it is un-
able to deliver on the promise of more objective and more transpar-
ent decision making. In fact, in most cases the use of cost-benefit
analysis is likely to deliver less objectivity and less transparency.
For the reasons we have discussed, there is nothing objective
about the basic premises of cost-benefit analysis. Treating individuals
solely as consumers, rather than as citizens with a sense of moral re-
sponsibility to the larger society, represents a distinct and highly con-
testable world view. Likewise, the use of discounting reflects judg-
ments about the nature of environmental risks and citizens'
responsibilities toward future generations that are, at a minimum, de-
batable. Because value-laden premises permeate cost-benefit analysis,
the claim that cost-benefit analysis offers an "objective" way to make
government decisions is simply bogus.
Furthermore, as we have seen, cost-benefit analysis relies on a byz-
antine array of approximations, simplifications, and counterfactual
hypotheses. Thus, the actual use of cost-benefit analysis inevitably in-
volves countless judgment calls. People with strong, and clashing, par-
tisan positions naturally will advocate that discretion in the application
of this methodology be exercised in favor of their positions, further
undermining the claim that cost-benefit analysis is objective.
Perhaps the best way to illustrate how little economic analysis has
to contribute, objectively, to the fundamental question'of how clean
and safe we want our environment to be is to refer again to the con-
troversy over cost-benefit analysis of the EPA's regulation of arsenic in
drinking water. As Cass Sunstein has recently argued, the available in-
formation on the benefits of arsenic reduction supports estimates of
net benefits from regulation ranging from less than zero up to $560
million or more." The number of deaths avoided annually by regula-
44 Cass R. Sunstein, The Arithmetic of Arsenic, 90 GEO. L.J. (forthcoming 2002).
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tion is, according to Sunstein, between zero and 112. 45 A procedure
that allows such an enormous range of different evaluations of a single
rule is certainly not the objective, transparent decision rule that its ad-
vocates have advertised.
These uncertainties arise from the limited knowledge of the epi-
demiology and toxicology of exposure to arsenic as well as the contro-
versial series of assumptions required for valuation and discounting of
costs and (particularly) benefits. As Sunstein explains, a number of
different positions, including most of those heard in the recent con-
troversy over arsenic regulation, could be supported by one or an-
other reading of the evidence.
Some analysts might respond that this enormous range of out-
comes is not possible if the proper economic assumptions are used-
if, for example, human lives are valued at $6 million apiece and dis-
counted at a five percent yearly rate (or, depending on the analyst,
other favorite numbers). But these assumptions beg fundamental
questions about ethics and equity, and one cannot decide whether to
embrace them without thinking through the whole range of moral is-
sues they raise. Yet once one has thought through these issues, there
is no need then to collapse the complex moral inquiry into a series of
numbers. Pricing the priceless merely translates our inquiry into a
different, and foreign, language-one with a painfully impoverished
vocabulary.
For many of the same reasons, cost-benefit analysis also generally
fails to achieve the goal of transparency. Cost-benefit analysis is a
complex, resource-intensive, and expert-driven process. It requires a
great deal of time and effort to attempt to unpack even the simplest
cost-benefit analysis. Few community groups, for example, have access
to the kind of scientific and technical expertise that would allow them
to evaluate whether, intentionally or unintentionally, the authors of a
cost-benefit analysis have unfairly slighted the interests of the com-
munity or some of its members. Few members of the public can par-
ticipate meaningfully in the debates about the use of particular re-
gression analyses or discount rates which are central to the cost-
45 Id.
46 Id. Given this enormous range of uncertainty, it is hard to understand Sun-
stein's belief (expressed in the same article) that cost-benefit analysis is still useful for
screening regulatory options. This could be true only if a significant number of seri-
ous proposals had costs that were many orders of magnitude greater than their bene-
fits. As we have discussed, this is a widely held, but empirically false, view of environ-
mental regulation.
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benefit method.
The translation of lives, health, and nature into dollars also ren-
ders decision making about the underlying social values less rather
than more transparent. As we have discussed, all of the various steps
required to reduce a human life to a dollar value are open to debate
and subject to uncertainty. However, the specific dollar values kicked
out by cost-benefit analysis tend to obscure these underlying issues
rather than encourage full public debate about them.
IV. PRACTICAL PROBLEMS
The last Part showed that there are deep, inherent problems with
cost-benefit analysis. In practice, these problems only get worse; lead-
ing examples of cost-benefit analysis fall far short of the theoretical
ideal. The continuing existence of these practical problems further
undercuts the utility and wisdom of using cost-benefit analysis to
evaluate environmental policy.
A. The Limits of Quantification
Cost-benefit studies of regulations focus on quantified benefits of
the proposed action and generally ignore other, nonquantified,
health and environmental benefits. This raises a serious problem be-
cause many benefits of environmental programs-including the pre-
vention of many nonfatal diseases and harms to the ecosystem-either
have not been quantified or are not capable of being quantified at this
time. Indeed, for many environmental regulations, the only benefit
that can be quantified is the prevention of cancer deaths. On the
other hand, one can virtually always come up with some number for
the costs of environmental regulations. Thus, in practice, cost-benefit
analysis tends to skew decision making against protecting public
health and the environment.
For example, regulation of workers' exposure to formaldehyde is
often presented as the extreme of inefficiency, supposedly costing $72
billion per life saved.4 This figure is based on the finding that the
regulation prevents cancers that occur only in small numbers, but
which have been thoroughly evaluated in numerical terms. But the
formaldehyde regulation also prevents many painful but nonfatal ill-
nesses excluded from the $72 billion figure. If described solely as a
means of reducing cancer, the regulation indeed would be very ex-
47 Morrall, supra note 22, at 25, 30 tbl.4.
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pensive. But if described as a means of reducing cancer and other
diseases, the regulation would make a good deal of sense. Workplace
regulation of formaldehyde is not a bad answer, but it does happen to
be an answer to a different question.
The formaldehyde case is by no means unique. Often, the only
regulatory benefit that can be quantified is the prevention of cancer,
yet cancer has a latency period of between five and forty years. When
discounted at five percent, a cancer death forty years from now has a
"present value" of only one-seventh of a death today. Thus, one of the
benefits that most often can be quantified-allowing it to be folded
into cost-benefit analysis-is also one that is heavily discounted, mak-
ing the benefits of preventive regulation seem trivial.
B. Ignoring What Cannot Be Counted
A related practical problem is that even when the existence of un-
quantified or unquantifiable benefits is recognized, their importance
is frequently ignored. Many advocates of cost-benefit analysis concede
that the decision-making process must make some room for non-
quantitative considerations. Some environmental benefits never have
been subjected to rigorous economic evaluation. Other important
considerations in environmental protection (such as the fairness of
the distribution of environmental risks) cannot be quantified and
priced.
In practice, however, this kind of judgment is often forgotten, or
even denigrated, once all the numbers have been crunched. No mat-
ter how many times the EPA, for example, says that one of its rules will
produce many benefits-like the prevention of illness or the protec-
tion of ecosystems-that cannot be quantified, the non-quantitative
aspects of its analyses are almost invariably ignored in public discus-
sions of its policies.
When the Clinton administration's EPA proposed, for example,
strengthening the standard for arsenic in drinking water, it cited many
human illnesses that would be prevented by the new standard but that
could not be expressed in numerical terms.48 Subsequent public dis-
cussion of the EPA's cost-benefit analysis of this standard, however, in-
evitably referred only to the EPA's numerical analysis and forgot
48 National Primary Drinking Water Regulations; Arsenic and Clarifications to
Compliance and New Source Contaminants Monitoring, 66 Fed. Reg. 6976, 7000-13,
(proposedJan. 22, 2001) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pts. 9, 141,142).
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about the cases of avoided illness that could not be quantified.4 9
C. Overstated Costs
There is also a tendency, as a matter of practice, to overestimate
the costs of regulations in advance of their implementation. This
happens in part because regulations often encourage new technolo-
gies and more efficient ways of doing business; these innovations re-
duce the cost of compliance. It is also important to keep in mind,
when reviewing cost estimates, that they are usually provided by the
regulated industry itself, which has an obvious incentive to offer high
estimates of costs as a way of warding off new regulatory requirements.
One study found that costs estimated in advance of regulation
were more than twice the actual costs in eleven out of twelve cases.50
Another study found that advance total cost estimates were more than
25% higher than actual costs for fourteen out of twenty-eight regula-
tions; advance estimates were more than 25% too low in only three of5 1 5
the twenty-eight cases. Before the 1990 Clean Air Act Amendments5
2
took effect, industry anticipated that the cost of sulfur reduction un-
der the amendments would be $1500 per ton:5 In 2000, the actual
cost was under $150 per ton!4 Of course, not all cost-benefit analyses
overstate the actual costs of regulation, but given the technology-
forcing character of environmental regulations, it is not surprising to
find a marked propensity to overestimate the costs of such rules.
In a related vein, many companies have begun to discover that en-
vironmental protection actually can be good for business in some re-
spects. Increased energy efficiency, profitable products made from
waste, and decreased use of raw materials are just a few of the cost-
saving or even profit-making results of turning more corporate atten-
49 E.g., Michael Kinsley, Bush Is Right on Arsenic. Da!n, WASH. POST, Apr. 13, 2001,
at A23; Sebastian Mallaby, Saving Statistical Lives, WASH. POST, Mar. 5, 2001, at A19;
George F. Will, The Costs of Moral Exhibitionism, WASH. POST, Apr. 15, 2001, at B7.
50 Eban Goodstein & Hart Hodges, Polluted Data: Overestimating Environmental
Costs, AM. PROSPECT, Nov.-Dec. 1997, at 64, 64; see also HART HODGES, ECON. POL'Y
INST., FALLING PRICES: COST OF COMPLYING WITH ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATIONS
ALMOST ALWAYS LESS THAN ADVERTISED (1997) (reporting on the same study).
51 Winston Harrington et al., On the Accuracy of Regulatory Cost Estimates, 19 J. POL'Y
ANALYSIS & MGMT. 297, 306, 307 tbl.2 (2000).
52 Pub. L. No. 101-549, tit. IV, 104 Stat. 2585 (1990).
53 Goodstein & Hodges, supra note 50, at 68. Nicholas Ashford's important work
sounds a similar theme. E.g., NICHOLAS A. ASHFORD & CHARLES C. CALDART,
TECHNOLOGY, LAW, AND THE WORKING ENVIRONMENT 506-07 (1991).
54 Id.
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tion to environmentally protective business practices." Cost-benefit
analyses typically do not take such money-saving possibilities into ac-
count in evaluating the costs of regulation.
V. THE MANY ALTERNATIVES TO COST-BENEFIT ANALYSIS
A common response to the criticisms of cost-benefit analysis is a
simple question: what is the alternative? The implication is that de-
spite its flaws, cost-benefit analysis is really the only tool we have for
figuring out how much environmental protection to provide.
This is just not true. Indeed, for thirty years, the federal govern-
ment has been protecting human health and the environment with-
out relying on cost-benefit analysis. The menu of regulatory options
that has emerged from this experience is large and varied. Choosing
among these possibilities depends on a variety of case-specific circum-
stances, such as the nature of the pollution involved, the degree of
scientific knowledge about it, and the conditions under which people
are exposed to it. As the following brief sketch of alternatives reveals,
cost-benefit analysis-a "one-size-fits-all" approach to regulation-
cannot be squared with the multiplicity of circumstances surrounding
different environmental problems.
For the most part, environmental programs rely on a form of
"technology-based" regulation, the essence of which is to require the
best available methods for controlling pollution. This avoids the mas-
sive research effort needed to quantify and monetize the precise
harms caused by specific amounts of pollution, which is required by
cost-benefit analysis. In contrast, the technology-based approach al-
lows regulators to proceed directly to controlling emissions. Simply
put, the idea is that we should do the best we can to mitigate pollution
we believe to be harmful.
Over the years, the EPA has learned that flexibility is a good idea
when it comes to technology-based regulation and thus has tended to
avoid specifying particular technologies or processes for use by regu-
lated firms; instead, the agency increasingly has relied on "perform-
ance-based" regulation, which tells firms to clean up to a certain,
specified extent, but does not tell them precisely how to do it. Tech-
nology-based regulation generally takes costs into account in deter-
mining the required level of pollution control but does not demand
the kind of precisely quantified and monetized balancing process that
55 For a recent report on this phenomenon, see Claudia H. Deutsch, Together at
Last: Cutting Pollution and Making Money, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 9, 2001, at BUI.
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is needed for cost-benefit analysis.
Another regulatory strategy that has gained a large following in
recent years is the use of "pollution trading," as in the sulfur dioxide
emissions trading program created for power plants under the 1990
Clean Air Act Amendments. 56 That program grants firms a limited
number of permits for pollution, but allows them to buy permits from
other firms. Thus, firms with high pollution control costs can save
money by buying permits, while those with low control costs can save
money by controlling emissions and selling their permits. The fixed
supply of permits, created by law, sets the cap on total emissions; the
trading process allows industry to decide where and how it is most
economical to reduce emissions to fit under the cap. Trading pro-
grams have become an important part of the federal program for con-
trolling pollution. These programs, too, have not used cost-benefit
analysis in their implementation. Congress, the EPA, or other officials
set the emissions cap, and the market does the rest.
It is theoretically possible that cost-benefit analysis could be used
to choose the overall limit on pollution that guides both performance-
based and market-based regulatory programs. However, this has not
been standard practice in the past; the limit on sulfur emissions in the
1990 Clean Air Act Amendments, for example, was set by a process of
political compromise.5' Given the problems with cost-benefit analysis,
political compromise cannot be viewed as an inferior way to set a cap
on emissions. Many regulatory programs have been a terrific success
without using cost-benefit analysis to set pollution limits.
One last example (a desire for reasonable brevity prevents us from
listing more) is informational regulation, which requires disclosures
to the public and/or to consumers about risks they face from expo-
sures to chemicals. These "right-to-know" regimes allow citizens and
consumers not only to know about the risks they face, but also em-
power them to do something about those risks. The Toxic Release In-
ventory created by the Emergency Planning and Community Right-to-
Know Act,11 the product warning labels required by California's
"Proposition 65,"59 and the consumer notices now required regarding
56 42 U.S.C. §§ 7651-7651o (1994).
57 Lisa Heinzerling, Selling Pollution, Forcing Democracy, 14 STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 300,
332 (1995).
58 42 U.S.C. §§ 11001-11050 (1994).
5. The Safe Drinking Water and Toxic Enforcement Act of 1986, CAL. HEALTH &
SAFETY CODE §§ 25249.5-25249.13 (West 1999).
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drinking water that contains hazardous chemicals,6° are all variants of
this type of information-based regulation. Not one of these popular
and effective programs relies on cost-benefit analysis.
The arguments for flexible technology-based regulation and for
incentive-based programs like pollution trading and disclosure re-
quirements are sometimes confused with the arguments for cost-
benefit analysis. But both technology-based and incentive-based regu-
lation take their goals from elected representatives rather than from
economic analysts, even though the means adopted by these regulatory
strategies are strongly influenced by attention to costs. The current
style of cost-benefit analysis, however, purports to set the ends, not just
the means, of environmental policy, and that is where its aspirations
amount to arrogance.
Economic analysis has had its successes and made its contribu-
tions; it has taught us a great deal over the years about how we can
most efficiently and cheaply reach a given environmental goal. It has
taught us relatively little, however, about what our environmental
goals should be. Indeed, while economists have spent three decades
wrangling about how much a human life, or a bald eagle, or a beauti-
ful stretch of river is worth in dollars, ecologists, engineers, and other
specialists have gone about the business of saving lives and eagles and
rivers without waiting for formal, quantitative analysis proving that sav-
ing these things is worthwhile.
CONCLUSION
Two features of cost-benefit analysis distinguish it from other ap-
proaches to evaluating the advantages and disadvantages of environ-
mentally protective regulations: the translation of lives, health, and
the natural environment into monetary terms, and the discounting of
harms to human health and the environment that are expected to oc-
cur in the future. These features of cost-benefit analysis make it a ter-
rible way to make decisions about environmental protection, for both
intrinsic and practical reasons.
Nor is it useful to keep cost-benefit analysis around as a kind of
regulatory tag-along, providing information that regulators may find
"interesting" even if not decisive. Cost-benefit analysis is exceedingly
time- and resource-intensive, and its flaws are so deep and so large
that this time and these resources are wasted on it. Once a cost-
6O 42 U.S.C. § 300g-3(c)( 4 ) (Supp 11. 1996) (amending the Safe Drinking Water
Act to require annual "consumer confidence reports").
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benefit analysis is performed, its bottom line number offers an irre-
sistible sound bite that inevitably drowns out more reasoned delibera-
tion. Moreover, given the intrinsic conflict between cost-benefit
analysis and the principles of fairness that animate, or should animate,
our national policy toward protecting people from being hurt by
other people, the results of cost-benefit analysis cannot simply be
"given some weight" along with other factors, without undermining
the fundamental equality of all citizens-rich and poor, young and
old, healthy and sick.
Cost-benefit analysis cannot overcome its fatal flaw: it is com-
pletely reliant on the impossible attempt to price the priceless values
of life, health, nature, and the future. Better public policy decisions
can be made without cost-benefit analysis, by combining the successes
of traditional regulation with the best of the innovative and flexible
approaches that have gained ground in recent years.
